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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
extent of liability of the defendant-broadcaster for a seemingly
uncontrollable remark, save that a good cause of action is stated
against it.
In examining the case in relation to the judicial development of
the law, it would seem to sanction a contradiction in terms. No longer
need a libel be "considered as written, and a slander as spoken,
defamation." 4 This is in direct violation of the dictum laid down in
Locke v. Gibbons,3 5 and followed by all jurisdictions save two,3 6 that
"our courts cannot legislate to eradicate the long-established distinc-
tions between libel and slander." 3
lVhile it is true that damage from defamatory statements can
almost be presumed to occur over the modern electronic media, it
would seem more logical to include oral defamation by radio or tele-
vision as a category of slander per se.38 Another solution might be
to discard the "outmoded" forms and make one action for defamation
with certain categories exempt from proof of special damages. The
Legislature and not the courts would seem the best method of cor-
recting a field of our law rapidly becoming confused and divided by
contradiction.
A
ZONING - ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - DENIAL OF BUILDING
APPROVAL TO CHURCH I 1ELD ARBITRARY AND UNREASONABLE. -
The petitioner brought a proceeding under Article 78 of the New
York Civil Practice Act to review a decision of the Planning Board
of the town of Brighton. The town zoning ordinance required the
approval of the Board for the erection of a church with accessory
uses in a restricted class "A" zoning district. The petitioner applied
for approval; the Board denied it and was affirmed in the courts
below. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding the Board's decision
arbitrary and unreasonable. Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Board,
1 N.Y.2d 508, 136 N.E.2d 827 (1956).
Present day zoning, which is of comparatively recent origin 1
resulted from the recognition that some regulation of private property
34 Locke v. Gibbons, 164 Misc. 877, 880, 299 N.Y. Supp. 188, 193 (Sup. Ct.
1937), aff'd mere., 253 App. Div. 887, 2 N.Y.S.2d 1015 (1st Dep't 1938).
35 Ibid.
36 See Summit Hotel Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 336 Pa. 182, 8 A.2d
302 (1939) ; see also Coffey v. Midland Broadcasting Co., 8 F. Supp. 889 (W.D.
Mo. 1934).
37 Locke v. Gibbons, supra note 34.
38 See note 2 supra. It is interesting to note that falsely imputing unchastity
to a woman was made actionable per se by statute. This was formerly adopted
in Section 1908 of the New York Code of Civil Procedure and is continued
today in the New York Rules of Civil Practice, Rule 97.
' Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty !Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386 (1926).
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owners was necessary. 2  The courts have upheld it against constitu-
tional objection, as a valid exercise of a state's police power.3 In
exercising police power, the state may delegate the zoning power to
municipalities by enabling acts.
4
The act involved in the instant case provides that the following
purposes are to be accomplished:
. . . [T]o lessen congestion in the streets, to secure safety from fire, flood,
panic and other dangers; to promote health and general welfare; to provide
adequate light and air; to prevent the overcrowding of land; to avoid undue
concentration of population; to facilitate the adequate provision of transporta-
tion, water, sewerage, schools, parks and other public requirements. Such
regulations shall be made with reasonable consideration, among other things,
as to the character of the district and its peculiar suitability for particular
uses, and with a view to conserving the value of buildings and encouraging
the most appropriate use of land throughout such municipality.5
To avail itself of the act, the municipal legislative body must first
appoint a zoning commission.6 The commission holds public hearings,
a,ter which it recommends to the local legislative body the boundaries
of the various districts, and the appropriate regulations to be enforcel
therein. 7 Any ordinance adopted must conform to the enabling act,
and contain standards to guide its application by adninistrative
bodies.8 The ruling of an officer, department, board or bureau may
be reviewed by the supreme court in a proceeding under Article 78
of the Civil Practice Act.9
In the instant case, the town board of Brighton, enacted a zoning
ordinance which stated in part: "For the purpose of promoting the
public health, safety, morals or the general welfare . . . the Town of
Brighton is hereby divided in four classes of districts.... .0 One
of these districts was residential and in turn was subdivided into
"A," "B," and "C" classes." The Diocese was denied approval to
build a church and accessory uses in the class "A" area. 12  Special
2 Id. at 386-87; BAssErr, ZONING 45-46 (1936).
3 V:lage of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). See
Lincoln Trust Co. v. Williams Bldg. Corp., 229 N.Y. 313, 128 N.E. 209 (1920);
City of Utica v. Hanna, 202 App. Div. 610, 195 N.Y. Supp. 225 (4th Dep't
1922).
4 See BAssErr, ZONING 13, 45 (1936). See also Headley v. City of
Rochester, 272 N.Y. 197, 5 N.E2d 198 (1936) (by implication); Stubbe v.
Adamson. 220 N.Y. 459, 116 N.E. 372 (1917).
5N.Y. TOWN LAW § 263; see N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 177. Such purposes
are enumerated in most enabling acts. BAssETr, ZONING 51 (1936).
6 N.Y. TOWN LAw § 266; N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 179-a.
7 Ibid.
8 See 1 RATHKOPF AND RATHKOPF, ZONING AND PLANN9ING 103 (3d ed.
1956).
9N.Y. •TOWN LAW § 267(7) ; N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 179-b.
10 Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Board, 1 N.Y.2d 508, 515, 136 N.E.2d
827, 829 (1956).
12 Ibid.
12 The accessory uses proposed by the Diocese were a "school; meeting
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term "3 and the appellate division 14 held that the town bodies had not
abused their discretion in denying the permit.
The Court of Appeals found that the board's decision bore no
substantial relation to the standard of public health, safety, morals or
general welfare of the community, and hence, was arbitrary and un-
reasonable. 15 Specifically the Court said, the Planning Board abused
its discretion when it allowed the following considerations to influence
its determination: (1) as the area in question was completely built-up
and is strictly residential in character, the imposition of a church and
school would change the character of the residential area; good plan-
ning requires that churches and schools be built in areas where future
residential growth could accommodate itself to them; (2) property
values would be adversely affected; (3) good planning requires
larger and more expensive homes rather than tax-exempt churches;
(4) enjoyment of neighboring property would be decreased;
(5) traffic hazards would be created; (6) the accessory uses proposed
by the Diocese were not within the scope of church activities. 16
The Court held the considerations of the Planning Board to be
unavailing to support its decision. The first, in effect, is a declara-
tion that churches could not be built in the particular area even though
allowed by the ordinance. The claim of the respondents was, in fact,
that churches could only be built in class "C" areas. Such a policy
is not authorized by the zoning ordinance.17
In Community Synagogue v. Bates,18 a case decided the same
day as the instant case, the Court had denied that an administrative
zoning authority had the power to deny an application for a church
at a "precise spot." The Court disposed of the second consideration
on the ground that mere pecuniary loss to a few persons should not
bar 9 church in view of their high purpose and moral value. The
third ground, because it is the policy of the state that religious prop-
erty shall be exempt from taxation, and therefore it cannot be seri-
ously argued that the denial of the permit because of a loss in tax
revenue is in furtherance of the general welfare. The fourth and fifth
because decreased enjoyment of neighboring property due to noise and
the possibility of traffic hazards are insufficient. The sixth because
room; kindergarten, small games field, open field and hard-top play areas; and
parking lot which would accommodate 144 cars." Id. at 516, 136 N.E.2d at 830.
13 Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Board, 207 Misc. 1021, 141 N.Y.S.2d
487 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
14 Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Board, 1 A.D.2d 86, 147 N.Y.S.2d 392
(4th Dep't 1955).
15 Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Board, 1 N.Y.2d 508, 526, 136 N.E.2d
827, 837 -(1956).
16 Id. at 523-26, 136 N.E.2d at 834-37.
17 See State ex rel. Tampa, Fla., Co. of Jehovah's Witnesses, North Unit.
Inc. v. City of Tampa, 48 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 1950) ; State ex rel. Synod of Ohio
v. Joseph, 139 Ohio St. 229, 39 N.E.2d 515 (1942) ; City of Sherman v. Simms,
143 Tex. 115, 183 S.W.2d 415 (1944).
is I N.Y.2d 445, 136 N.E.2d 488 (1956).
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the accessory uses proposed by the Diocese are well within the scope
of its activities. In the Community Synagogue case, it was said,
"a church is more than merely an edifice affording people the oppor-
tunity to worship God." 19
The Court cites with approval cases in foreign jurisdictions 20
and in a lower New York court 2' holding that a zoning ordinance
may not wholly exclude a church or synagogue from any residential
district. Though this is dicta, it demonstrates the Court's attitude
toward the validity of such ordinances.
The effect of the instant decision is to remove the above-stated
grounds from the consideration of administrative zoning bodies when-
ever a religious organization seeks a use permit to build. It will be
noted that some of the grounds given by the Planning Board are
found in that section of the enabling act dealing with purposes to be
accomplished by zoning. The Court states, however, that "it must
be borne in mind that churches and schools occupy a different station
from mere commercial enterprises and when the church enters the
picture different considerations apply." 22
The dissent states that now disapproval of a religious use is hardly
possible. But there are still grounds upon which a church may be
validly denied a use permit.2 3 This case shows, however, that the
courts will scrutinize very carefully attempts to exclude churches for
policy reasons.
19 Id. at 453, 136 N.E.2d at 493.
20 See, e.g., Ellsworth v. Gercke, 62 Ariz. 198, 156 P.2d 242 (1945); State
ex rel. Roman Catholic Bishop of Reno v. Hill, 59 Nev. 231, 90 P.2d 217
(1939) (per curiam); City of Sherman v. Simms, 143 Tex. 115, 183 S.W.2d
415 (1944).
21 North Shore Unitarian Soc'y Inc. v. Village of Plandome, 200 Misc. 524,
109 N.Y.S.2d 803 (Sup. Ct 1951).
22 Diocee of Rochester v. Planning Board, 1 N.Y.2d 508, 523, 136 N.E.2d
827, 834 (1956) ; accoid, Garden City Jewish Center v. Village of Garden City,
2 Misc. 2d 1009, 155 N.Y.S.2d 523 (Sup. Ct 1956).
23 See Garden City Jewish Center v. Village of Garden City, supra note 22;
City of Sherman v. Simms, supra note 20.
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